Introduction
The value of anonymous speech in society is regarded as a cornerstone of democratic government. This position also applies to Internet speech. However, recent legal developments in the Untied States, pressure actors harmed by such speech to seek recourse from the actual speaker, as opposed to an intermediate actor such as the technological equivalent of traditional publisher, the online service provider. This pressure means that in increasing numbers the identity of those anonymous speakers will be sought. Several courts have dealt with the factors under which a legal request in the form of a subpoena to obtain the identity of an anonymous speaker will be granted. These factors are identified and discussed. As a result several predictors can be established that indicate the circumstances under which future subpoenas will succeed. These predictors can also be used to draft organizational policies regarding anonymous speech that would conform to legal precedent thus making anonymous speakers-those specific to the organization as well as anonymous speakers in general-aware of the circumstance under which their anonymity might be breeched. The purpose of this iteration is to indicate how internal institutional policy formation or decision-making can be undertaken consistent with the principles of the developing law. This in turn serves to make the circumstances surrounding the expression of anonymous speech within the organization legally compliant.
Background: Defamation
In general, an action for defamation requires a showing that the plaintiff has been exposed to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that it causes a person to be shunned or avoided or otherwise injures his or her standing in the community (Keeton and Prosser, 1984, 773) . The four elements of a claim for defamation are: a false and defamatory statement, that is published to one or more third parties without privilege, by a publisher who is at least negligent in communicating the information, and that results in presumed or actual damage (Street and Grant, 2001, §6.02, at 6-3) . Typically, those who act as a publisher or re-publisher (Restatement of Torts §578) of defamatory material are also liable with the speaker or writer of the defamation. The law imposes this burden on the intermediary as publisher for several reasons. First, as the publisher benefits economically from the publication, so it should also share in its social cost. Second the publisher
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may have resources or be in the most efficient position to intercede in preventing the harm, i.e., it can halt or cease publication of the harmful material. Finally, imposing liability of publishers is a form of risk allocation; if an individual author would carry the sole burden of responsibility for defamatory harms, future speakers (authors) might be less willing to speak (write), and future speech might be chilled. In this way, publishers offset the cost of a single harm against the profits received from numerous other authors' successes.
Another category of intermediary is known as a distributor. However, distributors are not liable, unless the distributor knows or has reason to know of the defamatory nature of the publication it distributes, through sales, rentals, loans, etc. The law draws a distinction between a true publisher or re-publisher for that matter, of a defamatory statement and a mere distributor of a defamatory statement. "Examples of such distributors include libraries, bookstores, and news vendors" (Talbot, 1999, §10.4, at 10-4) . Another category of intermediary is the conduit or the common carrier. Common carriers, a telecommunication service provider such as a telephone company, are generally not liable for defamatory messages sent by third parties over its systems, as a common carrier is neither a publisher nor distributor. However, in cyberspace parties acting as mere intermediaries (distributor or common carrier), traditionally secure from such actions, may be exposed to liability given the unsettled nature of the Internet legal environment. Technological advances often blur the legal distinction between the intermediary (distributor and generally not liable), and the information creator and producer (author or publisher, generally liable). This operates to compound the legal problematic. Electronic publishing is a good case in point (Counts and Martin, 1996; Talbot, 1999, §10.15) . A web site operator that cuts, pastes, grafts or otherwise edits content onto its web site has arguably moved beyond the function of a mere conduit or distributor and is now acting more like a traditional publisher or editor. The ability to achieve instantaneous and prolonged distribution of a work in cyberspace may also confuse the line between distributor (no liability unless know or reason to know standard is met) and true publisher. Unlike some jurisdictions, the United States generally follows a single publication rule, i.e., publish 20,000 copies of a book containing defamatory content and courts will view the pressing of a particular copy of the book and its subsequent sale (distribution) as a single publication, not 20,000 distributions, i.e., 20,000 separate acts of defamation. The single publication rule has been extended to the Internet; while the act of making defamatory material available over the Internet might constitute a "publication," in the absence of some alteration or change in form, its continued availability on the Internet does not constitute a republication each time it is accessed, read, or even forwarded, that would start the statute of limitations running anew with each interaction. (Firth v. State of New York; Van Buskirk v. The New York Times Co.) It should also be observed that defamation in other jurisdictions, especially those inheriting from the English legal tradition, may not distinguish between the author and publisher, and distributor, or provide only limited protection to distributors. (Lipinski, Buchanan, and Britz, 2002) It is the strong protection that speech receives under the U.S. Constitution that accounts for the application of differing legal standards and often contributes to opposite outcomes in similar defamation suits in the United States, versus for example, the United Kingdom.
Even within the United States, the developing law is often inconsistent, with one infamous decision holding that an online service provider (thought to be at most a mere conduit or distributor) liable for the defamatory postings of third parties on its system (Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.) . In Stratton Oakmont, the court was persuaded by evidence that suggested the online service provider Prodigy acted more like a publisher than a distributor when it appointed a board moderator, used filtering software to regulate content and held itself out as a family oriented (another indication of content control) network access provider. At the same time several legislative initiatives in the United States concerned with regulating the content of information available to children on the Internet and in other media have appeared, such as the V-Chip legislation (officially known as the Parental Choice in Television Programming Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. §303), the Children's Online Protection Act (codified at 47 U.S.C. §231), regulating access by minors to commercial pornography on the World Wide Web, and the Children's Internet Protection Act requiring filtering software in qualifying schools and libraries (adding 20 U.S.C. §3601, and amending 20 U.S.C. §9143 and 47 U.S.C. §254). In conjunction with the V-Chip initiative Congress added 47 U.S.C. §230(c) to the federal communication law offering "immunity" to online service providers (both provisions were part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996). Congress sought, in section 230(c), to ensure that online service providers, when attempting to promote the national policy of protecting children and others from obscene or indecent material online, would not be viewed as the editor of that content (at least when their efforts at protection, alteration, modification, etc. failed) and be placed into the "publisher" category of actors for purposes of liability assessment. This new section of the federal communication law overrules the decision in Stratton Oakmont. (Conference Report, 1996, 194) 
Developments: Section 230 and Recent Precedent
In passing Section 230 Congress commented that " [t] hese protections apply to all interactive computer services [ICS] , as defined in new subsection 230(f)(2), including non-subscriber systems such as those operated by many businesses for employee use" (Conference Report, 1996, 194) . Section 230(f)(2) defines an ICS as "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the ner, 1999; Ballon, 1997; Kane, 1999; , expansion of Section 230 immunity continues, even to public libraries in contexts other than defamation. In, Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, the court granted a defendant's motion for summary judgment when the library patronplaintiff claimed that a lack of filtering software on Internet access terminals caused her child to be exposed to harmful materials. The court relied in part on Section 230 in providing tort immunity from harmful material that the library, as a conduit, made accessible through its connection to the Internet, i.e., the library did not create the content nor provide a link, nor was the mere provision of Internet access deemed a publication, thus no publisher, or intermediary liability.
Legal precedent establishes that those who act in the capacity of re-publishers of defamatory material and not as mere distributors are equally liable for the defamatory material as is the initial publisher. The question here is whether there exist circumstances whereby the online service provider, bulletin board operator, etc. would move out of its traditional role as mere distributor and be placed in the position of a re-publisher or creator of defamatory or otherwise harmful content. According to Street those information or service providers that "claim to exercise editorial control or do in fact exercise editorial control . . . are likely to be treated as publishers and held liable for defamation in the materials they publish" (Street, 2000, §6-2(b) , at 625-626, see also, Zuckman, Et al., 1999, Section 5 .10, at 612).
It could be argued that through its web site, through linking, cutting and pasting or uploading content the information organization or educational institution has moved beyond the mere provision of online service (conduit 
Anonymous Internet Speech: Recent Precedent
Several cases involving anonymous speech on the Internet have arisen. Moreover, as all intermediaries such as a school, library or commercial provider of an interactive computer service, are conceivably immune from tort liability under section 230, whether acting in the capacity of a publisher or distributor, individuals who are harmed by Internet speech or other tortfeasance have but one recourse and that recourse is to seek remedy from the actual speaker or creator of the harmful content. As a result and as discussed below, the developing precedent involves categories of harms beyond defamatory speech alone, yet all target the anonymous speaker or poster of the message.
When speakers or creators choose to speak under the veil of anonymity, those harmed have sought to compel through legal process (a subpoena) the divulgation of the identity of the anonymous speaker. The identity of the anonymous speaker is necessary before the legal action against the perpetrator (the speaker or creator) of the harm can continue. Thus courts are placed in the unenviable but inevitable position of deciding when a person's right to proper redress by the courts (i.e., exercising one's right to obtain his or her day in court) outweighs another person's right to speak anonymously. (See Tables 2a-d for a detailed summary of the issues involved in the foregoing cases.) Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d "The trial court must consider and decide those applications by striking a balance between the well-established First Amendment right to speak anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests and reputation through the assertion of recognizable claims based on the actionable conduct of the anonymous, fictitiously-named defendants." 774 A.2d at 760.
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Notes:
*Four rationales for the application of the right to speak anonymously on the Internet appear in the case law: (I) applicable precedent regarding free speech, (II) historical tradition of protecting anonymous speech, (III) reality of speech in the 21st century and the extension of free speech and anonymous speech concepts to the Internet, and (IV) promotion of competition in the Internet environment (anonymity, like privacy, is becoming a salable commodity). **"It is offensive-not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society-that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and them obtain a permit to do so. Even if the issuance of permits by the mayor's office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and consti- 
Table 1. Development of the Right to Speak Anonymously
The following discussion reviews the circumstances of several recent and relevant cases, identifies the standards each court used when making its determination of whether or not to order the release of the anonymous speaker's identity, and finally attempts to characterize and categorize those standards into a synthesized set of common factors that can be used in successive litigation or adapted by an institution when evaluating its response to an anonymous speech issue, either as part of its own policy formation or related decision-making. The factors are as follows and are explained below as the cases are discussed: jurisdiction, good faith (both internal and external), necessity (both basic and absolute), and, at times, proprietary interest. Finally, there is a sense, expressed more definitely in latter cases discussed below, of necessity in granting the plaintiff's subpoena request, i.e., that redress (begun by "service of process") due the plaintiff by the defendant is not otherwise possible without the divulgation of the identity of the anonymous speaker or speakers ("the plaintiff should file a request for discovery with the Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery requested as well as identification of a limited number of persons or entities on whom discovery process might be served and for which there is a reasonable likelihood that the discovery process will lead to identifying information about defendant that would make service of process possible" 580). Can the identity be determined without the service provider or other intermediary revealing the identity of the anonymous speaker? If so, then the necessity requirement has not been met and the court will not exercise its subpoena power to compel divulgation of the identifying information from the service provider or other party holding the information.
Tables 2a-d. ANONYMOUS INTERNET SPEECH: STANDARD OF DISCOVERY
The court employed the use of four factors or safeguards to "ensure that this unusual procedure [the issuance of a subpoena ordering the release of the identity of an anonymous domain name registrant and alleged trademark infringer] will only be employed in cases where the plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent use of this method to harass or intimidate." (Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 578) The first factor identified establishes that a court has the right to exert control over the questionable behavior. In law this is know as jurisdiction. As a practical matter jurisdiction is a way of saying that there is agreement on the standard of conduct (expressed in the law of the jurisdiction) by which to evaluate the claim made by the plaintiff of harm caused by the defendant. In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com the court required that "the plaintiff should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court." (578)
The facts of In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc. (Table 2b .) are somewhat different; here the plaintiffs or party requesting disclosure (itself proceeding under the pseudonym "Anonymous Publicly Traded Company) alleged that comments posted to chat rooms by five John Doe participants were defamatory, misrepresentative and if made by certain knowledgeable persons such as employees constituted a breach of fiduciary duties and contractual obligations of those individuals owed to the company." The Virginia court began with a discussion of the precedent protecting anonymous speech. Since the granting of the order would have involved a governmental function, i.e., the court ordered release of John Doe identities, the court placed its continued analysis within a constitutional (free speech) context. In addition to the historical and judicial precedent and the application of those concepts to the Internet speech, the court also pointed out that piercing the veil of Internet anonymity might also harm in an economic sense, an online service provider such as American Online, by driving customers away from America Online, to other service providers that are more vigilant in protecting their customer's privacy. (In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc., 32)
The court was also concerned that such requests by plaintiffs do not turn in routine "hunting" exercises and chill speech on the Internet. This requires plaintiffs demonstrate good faith. In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com the court looked to two types of good faith. One good faith factor is derived from the plaintiff's actions and might be viewed as accomplishing an internal consistency of sorts as it looks at factors internal to the litigation, i.e., the plaintiff's actions ("the party should identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant. This element is aimed at ensuring that plaintiffs make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of service of process and specifically identifying defendants," 579). The other good faith factor is derived from the legal merits of the case or the claim the plaintiff is making ("plaintiff should establish to the Court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss," 579). This might be called "legal" good faith; it is an assessment made by the court to the facts at hand and thus is external in character. The good faith of the plaintiff whereas is an internal factor and is dependant upon how the plaintiff has conducted him or herself. Both factors relate to the consistency of legal process as meeting these two factors ensures that there is merit to both the plaintiff's actions and his or her legal claim.
The court pointed to three criteria that must be satisfied: "a court should only order a non-party, Internet service provider to provide information concerning the identity of a subscriber (1) when the court is satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit was filed and (3) the subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim. Finally, the "identity information is centrally needed to advance the claim" language is taken from American Online's own anonymous speaker divulgation policy ("AOL acknowledged on brief that it has complied with hundreds of similar subpoenas issued by Virginia courts when it has been satisfied (1) that the party seeking the information has pleaded with specificity a prima facie claim that it is the victim of particular, specified tortious conduct and (2) that the subpoenaed identity information was centrally needed to advance the claim. Balance: right to speak with the right of redress, the duty owed customers and the prevention of the loss of the ability to compete. *** Table 2b . In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc.
The second In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc. factor contains two elements also present in the earlier Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com formulation: the "good faith basis to contend" is viewed as a good faith requirement as to the moving party (internal consistency) and the "conduct actionable in the jurisdiction," the more general jurisdictional requirement, i.e., that this is the proper court before which to bring the action.
Another case for review (Table 2c ) presents a different posture between the plaintiff, the party moving for disclosure and the anonymous speakers. In Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., the anonymous speakers were not alleged to have caused harm to the plaintiffs. Rather the shareholders of 2TheMart.com alleged that the company's directors and officers engaged in wrongdoing that harmed the shareholders and so brought what is known in corporate law as a "derivative action" or lawsuit against those directors and officers in a separate but thus related litigation. The directors and officers (the defendants in the related lawsuit but the party moving for disclosure in this case) believed that the true perpetrators of the harm were the anonymous posters of the messages on boards operated by InfoSpace, an online service provider, in specific, on its Silicon Investor website. The Doe v. 2TheMart.com court adopted the following four-part test: "(1) the subpoena seeking the information was issued in good faith and not for any improper purpose, (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or defense is unavailable from any other source." (Doe v. 2The Mart.com 1095, 1097) While there is no clear factor relating to jurisdiction, the Doe v. 2TheMart.com configuration is still consistent with the previous cases as to the requirement of a jurisdictional standard. This is so for one of two reasons. Jurisdiction might to some extent be either implied, or in the alternative, it is not required because this case unlike the others involves the actions of third parties. In other words, the jurisdiction or standard of conduct under which the actions of the anonymous speakerperpetrators is to be judged is not relevant to this immediate issue of divulgation because the initial dispute (shareholders versus directors) is not before the court at this time.
Unfortunately for the directors and officers this information was indeed available from other sources, including the message board where the postings were originally made, thus the court denied their request to issue an order to release the identity of the anonymous speakers. Table 3 ). Moreover, the court in Doe v. 2TheMart.com imposed an additional necessity criterion. This is called absolute necessity: "information it needs to establish its defense is unavailable from any other source." Not only must the identity of the anonymous speaker be materially relevant (basic necessity) to the dispute between the parties, it must be unavailable elsewhere (absolute necessity). As observed earlier, the court found the plaintiff's reasoning flawed, as the information was readily available from various chat room archives. there is both internal (as to party) and external (as to claim) consistency that are labeled good faith and "legal" good faith, respectively. The subpoena, in order to be granted must be "issued in good faith and not for any improper purpose" and it must relate to the advancement of "core claims or defenses." Unfortunately, the identity information related to only one of twenty-seven defenses and so the court concluded that its standards were not met. This is significant because unlike the International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 , good faith as to party ("identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitute actionable speech") is present. However, the court suggests that the plaintiffs must "undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters" and "afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application." Yet, the court does not also intend a situation where the entire proceedings be conducted with the defendant incognito: "To allow a potential tortfeasor to disprove a plaintiff's case before the plaintiff is even provide the opportunity to learn the defendant's identity, let alone gather any discovery, has no foundation in New Jersey law." 775 A.2d at 778.
Factors three and four both relate to necessity, but as this case involves the divulgation of a third party actor. The moving party, the "defendant" directors and officers were not requesting the information before proceeds against the anonymous speaker as perpetrator of some harm, but rather will ultimately use the information to proceed or defend against a different party (the shareholders) in another case (the derivative by shareholders against them). Here, the directors and officers needed the identity of the anonymous speakers in order to prepare a defense in the related case. As a result of the "once removed" relationship or third party nature of the anonymous speaker to the litigant (not needed in order to seek redress but in order to defend itself against another plaintiff seeking redress), the court expanded the necessity factor to include a requirement of what might best be labeled absolute necessity: "that the information it needs to establish its defense is unavailable from any other source."
While there is no specific mention of jurisdiction, it may be implied here as well from the "subject of a subpoena or application" requirement. An external consistency ("legal" good faith) is also present: "The complaint and all information provided to the court should be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously-named anonymous defendants...establishing that its action can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted...the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant." Passing a prima facie test in essence requires the court to apply the law of the jurisdiction to the alleged facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff thus ensuring consistency in its proceedings. Finally a factor relating the basic necessity is included, i.e., that the "necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity [is needed] to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed." However in applying the same criteria the Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v Release allowed.
"We offer the following guidelines to trial courts when faced with an application by a plaintiff for expedited discovery seeking an order compelling an ISP to honor a subpoena and disclose the identity of anonymous Internet posters who are sued for allegedly violating the rights of individuals or businesses."** Good Faith: Party (Internal Consistency) " [F] irst require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford to the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application."** "The court shall also require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitute actionable speech."** "Legal" Good Faith: Claim (External Consistency) "The complaint and all information provided to the court should be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a prima facie cause of action against the fictitiouslynamed anonymous defendants. In addition to establishing that its action can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to R. 4:6-2(f), the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant."** Necessity: Basic (as to party or claim) "Finally, assuming the court concludes that the plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause of action, the court must balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed."** "The trial court must consider and decide those applications by striking a balance between the well-established First Amendment right to speak anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests and reputation through the assertion of recognizable claims based on the actionable conduct of the fictitiously-named defendants."** "In balancing Moonshine's right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for disclosure, it is clear that the motion judge struck [sic] the proper balance in favor of identity disclosure." ** *** Balance: right to speak anonymously with the right of redress and the right to protect proprietary interests. Notes: *The information in a third party action (Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc. ) must relate to a "core claim or defense," not merely relate to the pleadings as a whole, i.e., withstanding a "motion to dismiss" as in Seescandy.com or found in the "pleadings or evidence" of the America Online dispute. **Regarding the necessity factor, there is a subtle but increasing standard in the three cases progressing from "make service of process possible" (Seescandy.com) to "centrally needed to advance the claim" (America Online) to "directly and materially relevant" (2TheMart.com). The 2TheMart.com court cited favorably both previous cases. ***When the dispute involves third party action-the person seeking to discover the identity does not seek remedy from the anonymous speaker-there is less need for the identity to be revealed. In these circumstances the "jurisdiction" factor is implied or not relevant as the actual dispute between the plaintiff and defendant may take place in other jurisdiction altogether. In order for the identity of a third party defamer to be revealed it must be "directly and materially relevant to a core defense" and supplemented or replaced entirely by a higher standard of necessity: the litigation of the plaintiff against the third party cannot proceed unless the veil of anonymity is pierced. This higher, additional standard of necessity is labeled "absolute" as the "information it [the moving party, i.e., 2TheMart.com] needs to establish its defense is unavailable from any other source." This higher standard in third party actions was observed in Doe v. 2TheMart.com: "The standard for disclosing the identity of a non-party witness must be higher than that articulated in Seescandy.com and America Online, Inc. When the anonymous Internet user is not a party to the case, the litigation can go forward without the disclosure of their identity." (140 F. Supp 2d at 1095.) ****Though not included as a specific factor, both the America Online, Inc. and Immunomedics, Inc. v . Doe cases phrased the ultimate use of the factors as offering assistance to courts in balancing the right to speak anonymously with potential impact that speech might have upon the proprietary interest of the plaintiff, either in the loss of future Internet speakers as customers to America Online in America Online or in harms perpetrated against the plaintiff itself in Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe. ***** The standard articulated by the New Jersey court in the Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v . Doe cases suggest a factor that anticipates the anonymous speaker be given notice of the impending divulgation: "We hold that when such an application is made, the trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application. These notification efforts should include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request to the anonymous user on the ISP's pertinent message board." 775 A.2d at 761, and repeated again at 775 A.2d 773. Finally, the resulting difference in the outcomes between two cases from the same court with similar facts is also important because it suggests that the criteria used to determine whether or not a court will support the release of identity information of anonymous speakers is not reduced to a bright line test or a sole factor of the whether the identity is related to a primary party as speaker (released in Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com and Inc In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc.) versus a third party as speaker (release denied in Doe v. 2The Mart.com) , but may vary between two first party cases.
The New Jersey cases, both involving actions claimed to harm the proprietary interest of a corporation, are thus consistent with the developing formulation of other courts requiring two aspects of good faith, one as to party the other as to claim, another factor involving jurisdiction and a fourth concept of necessity, which is at least basic (needed to proceed) and may be absolute in third party actions (unavailable from any other source). (See Table 3 )
Incorporating Developing Legal Standards into Institutional Decision-Making
Courts have been consistent in the analysis of the factors that must be present before a court will either order enforcement of a discovery subpoena or a issue a subpoena of its own accord, and in either case pierce the veil of anonymous Internet speech. For example, America Online contended that it was unwilling to comply with the subpoena and release the names of the anonymous speakers because the company requesting the release refused to reveal is own identity, as a result the court issued a subpoena for release of the identity information. It should be observed that none of the criteria require in specific that the anonymous speaker be given notice that his or her identity is about to be revealed. Only the Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v . Doe court believed that notice should be first given in order to offer the anonymous a speaker an opportunity to respond to an impending divulgation of his or her identity. This suggests that a service provider or other entity could at least notify the anonymous poster of the impending release of his or her identity, consistent with the Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe decisions. In most cases the intermediary will either release the information on their own accord, or deny the request for release by the plaintiff in which instance several of the resulting cases have arisen. These factors can be used to construct institutional disclosure policies that indicate to the speaker-the customer, student or employee-when the veil of his or her anonymity will be pierced.
It is obvious that the standards courts employ will influence both the policies that institutions adopt and the decision-making it undertakes. Moreover, the standards articulated by courts may influence in specific those entities such as online service providers that field requests from third parties for release of customer identity information. This was evident in the Inc In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc. (AOL policy reprinted in footnote 2 and discussed at pages 27-28 of the decision). Consider the Yahoo! Policy at issue in Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v . Doe. The policy allowed release of identity information in one of three circumstances: 1) with the permission of the speaker, 2) in "special circumstances," when Yahoo! "believes in good faith that the law requires it," or 3) when it is necessary to identify, contact or bring legal action against someone who may be violating Yahoo!'s Terms of Service or may be causing injury to...anyone...that could be harmed by such activities," as quoted in Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 (775 A.2d at 762) . While adopting policy language linking institutional responses to developing legal standards or the reality of third party harms (ultimately determined by existing legal standards) might appear to provide the institution with somewhat of a legal or moral imperative to release the identity information it also requires cognizance of the developing law.
Consider Internet scenarios where the words of anonymous speakers may arguably cause harm and where the aggrieved party or some other party at interest might desire to know the source of the anonymous speech. It is obvious that an outside party might seek the disclosure of a customer, student or employee, in conjunction with a legal dispute if that individual has perpetrated some malfeasance against the outside party. In those cases the factors articulated in the previous discussion would apply. See, Table 2 and Table 3 . However, these factors can also be adapted and used to guide "disputes" that might arise internally within an institution as well. Here it is contemplated that no actual legal action would be taken, but an Intranet web master or other institutional online administrator or one acting in a similar capacity as a "watchdog" might receive internal requests for the release of identity information. In response the institution might look to the developing precedent and adapt the criteria for use in its own internal unique decision-making setting.
There are several benefits to this approach. The modeling of institutional policies for internal use consistent with developing precedent can help preserve a spirit of free speech, yet allow for the continued functioning of the organization. Such policies can also be easily adapted to apply in situations where the request is from an external source and would then mirror the case law more precisely. In the latter external-request scenario, a legally consistent policy could save the institution time and legal entanglement, as it would have the determinative factors already incorporated into its operating policies. In the former internal-request scenario, there may result a positive impact upon morale, as members of the organization base decisions on articulated standards, which in the present discussion attempt to incorporate common values such as free speech, privacy, anonymity, etc. As a result, this offers consistency between external (request from a third party) and internal (request coming from within the organization) decision-making.
Institutions such as commercial entities, schools or employers may wish to apply or adapt these evolving standards to situations likely to occur in their respective internal settings. Consider the following three scenarios: one from e-commerce, one from an educational environment and another in an employer-employee context. Suppose a web site proprietor would like to share customer information with another product or service department within the organization or with a related entity such as a subsidiary, or a school administrator would like to identify the student who posted a malicious message suggesting that the student-poster is the one behind recent acts of vandalism at the school, or an employer would like to identify an anonymous employee who may be engaging in a pattern of harassment of other employees or customers, or making improper (but not otherwise unlawful) comments about the employee or customer. (See Table 4 ) (It should be noted that this discussion does not incorporate the relevance of other laws that may forbid release of information to third parties, such as federal privacy legislation governing the release of customer information or student records. If this is a concern to the institution, then the custodian of the information should obtain the consent of the speaker as a condition of service, access or employment, as most laws contain a consent exception. The incorporation of these principles into the institutional structure demonstrates how legal precedent may impact the development of fair information practices even though, in light of the consent of the speaker, there would be no legal obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the information.)
How can the four factors be applied to institutional settings and guide decision-making in determining when it might be prudent to release the identity of anonymous posters either internally or externally to third parties? As with the application of these factors in the subpoena or court order scenarios, all four factors must be present or the release of identity cannot be made. In addition, the examples of the factors might be applied in the scenarios presented serve as mere suggestions, as particular institutions might derive their own "interpretations" of a how factor such as necessity might be applied.
Applying the jurisdiction factor would suggest that the anonymous speech occurred using the institution's technology or somehow relates to subject or context of the institution. For an e-educational setting this might mean that the harmful posting was made by students using the school's computer network and related to a school sponsored activity. For an e-commerce or employer-employee scenario this might mean that only the identity of current employees or customers could be released as opposed to former or future employees or customers. Different institutions could define the limits of this "jurisdiction" differently, but the concept remains the same, approximating the logical limits of subjects over which the institution has control.
The second, internal good faith factor might require that an employer not pierce that veil of anonymity for the sole purpose of snooping on what employees are saying to each other or about customers. Instead the identity of an employee could be released as part of an internal network "audit" in response to some perceived harm, i.e., in order to curb misuse of its system or to investigate the posting of harassing messages by employees, or to perform routine (as opposed to extraordinary, i.e., repeated and invasive) "business" or performance monitoring of employees. This concept of "ordinary course of business" or "legitimate business purpose" is often used in other contexts such as the regulation of privacy and electronic communications Finally, the necessity factor might suggest that divulgation of a student's identity would be released by school A (applying the factors) in response from a request from School B order to assist B in enforcing its zero tolerance policy. The request is made to school A by B for the identity of several of A's students who might have witnessed a potential infraction of school B's policy. Another example of necessity might exist in the investigation of a possible breach of a non-compete or non-disclosure agreement in an e-commerce or employment context where employer A suspects that former employee C is engaging in conduct in violation of the agreement. The request for information is made to employer B for customer information that A believes will help it determine whether or not C has violated the non-compete or non-disclosure agreement in force between A and C. Both examples mirror the third party scenario of the Doe v. 2The Mart.com case. In either case, the zero tolerance policy or the non-compete or non-disclosure agreement could not be enforced unless the institutionthe school or employer-knows the identity of a anonymous posters who can help it identify the deviation from the agreed upon behavior (tolerance policy or agreement).
As commented earlier, the release of the customer, student or employee identity could not be made unless some aspect of each of the four factors was present in a given situation. Incorporating such standards into internal institutional decision-making would impart a spirit of free speech and the right to speak anonymously that courts have attempted to preserve in legal proceedings. Furthermore, conforming institutional releases of identity to third parties according to the four articulated standards would also align institutional policies with the developing legal precedent should a request for disclosure be made by an external third party in conjunction with related legal proceedings.
Conclusion
This paper discussed the developing precedent concerning anonymous speech on the Internet. In specific, under what conditions will courts indorse the release of identity information relating to the anonymous speaker? Having an understanding of these cases will help institutions articulate appropriate responses when faced with similar requests for information from third parties or when the institution is itself the target of perceived harmful and anonymous speech, and it seeks to obtain the identity of the anonymous speaker. While courts have adopted various standards, this paper synthesized these into four factors: jurisdiction, good faith as to party, good faith as to legal claim, and necessity (basic or absolute). These standards can drive institutional decision-making, making it legally compliant (external requests for information), but factors can also be adopted to design internal policies and decision-making as well, and as a result contribute to an overall climate of compliance and consistency.
Please Note: This paper is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. However, this information is NOT provided as a substitute for legal advice. If legal advice or expert assistance is required, the services of a competent legal professional should be sought. 
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